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Recent Developments

Key-El v. State

;
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f;uf !o three decision,
the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that evidence of the
defendant's pre-arrest silence· in
the presence of police officers was
properly admitted as a tacit
admission. Key-El v. State, 349
Md. 811, 709 A.2d 1305 (1998).
In so holdirig, the court determined
that the admission of such
evidence did· not violate the
defendant's Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination.
On August 19, 1994, police
responded to a 911 call made by
Mrs. Key-El from the home she
shared with her husband ("the
defendant"). When the police
officers arrived to question her
concerning the incident, Mrs.
Key-El was crying. She responded
that the defendant had pulled her
hair and punched her in the face,
bruising her left eye during an
argument. Although the defendant
was only a few feet away from
Mrs. Key-El and able to hear her
stating these accusations to the
officers, he remained silent.
In a letter to the Office of the
State's Attorney following the
incident, Mrs. Key-El restated the
accusations against the defendant.
At trial, however, Mrs. Key-El
changed her story and stated that
she had been struck by the
defendant's girlfriend after she
found the two together. Mrs.
Key-El testified that the reason she
initially had accused the defendant
of hitting her was because she was
upset and wanted him to suffer.

PRE-ARREST
SILENCE IN THE
PRESENCE OF A
POLICE OFFICER
MAYBE
ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE AS A·
TACIT ADMISSION
By Anna R. Benshoof
At trial, the Circuit Court for
Baltimore
County
allowed
testimony as to the defendant's
pre-arrest silence.
A jury
convicted the defendant of battery
and sentenced him to five years
imprisonment.
The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the circuit court's
decision. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland then granted certiorari to
decide whether the circuit court
had abused its discretion in
admitting into evidence the
defendant's pre-arrest silence.
The defendant raised the
following two issues to the court
of appeals: (1) whether the
evidence of the defendant's
pre-arrest silence in the presence
of a police officer was admissible;
and (2) whether this evidence, if
deemed admissible, infringed upon
his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. Key-El, 349
Md. at 815, 709 A.2d at 1306. In
addressing the first issue, the court
noted that tacit admissions by a
party-opponent in both civil and

criminal actions have long been
recognized by Maryland courts as
an exception to the hearsay rule
under the common law. Id at 816,
709 A.2d at 1307.
The three elements that must
be satisfied in order for silence to
be considered a tacit admission
are: (1) the accused heard and
understood the accusation; (2) at
the time, the accused had the
chance to respond; and (3) under
the circumstances, a reasonable
person in the position of the
accused would have voiced a
response. Id. at 817, 709 A.2d at
1307 (quoting Henry v. State, 324
Md. 204, 241-42, 596 A.2d 1024,
1043 (1991)). The court held that
the defendant's silence met these
criteria. Id. at 818-19, 709 A.2d at
1308.
The defendant, however,
contended that his silence was too
ambiguous to be considered a tacit
admission and as such, was only of
minimal probative value. Id. at
817, 709 A.2d at 1307. The
defendant further contended that
evidence of his silence was unduly
prejudicial and violated his right to
remain silent. Id. Therefore, the
trial court erred in allowing it into
evidence. Id. The United States
Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, and the
Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland have all addressed the
issue of placing limits upon the
usage of a defendant's silence as
evidence in distinguishing between
pre-arrest and post-arrest silence.
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 55
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Id. at 817-18, 709 A.2d at
1307-08. Generally, courts have
held that pre-arrest silence is
admissible and does not violate a
defendant's constitutional rights;
whereas,
post-arrest silence,
specifically after a defendant has
been read his Miranda rights,
violates
a
defendant's
constitutional rights and is not
admissible. Id. (citations omitted).
The
most
applicable
Maryland case is Williams v. State,
4 Md. App. 342, 242 A.2d 813
(1968), in which the court of
special appeals held that a
defendant's silence, in the face of
an accusation by a third party in
the presence of a police officer,
was admissible as evidence of a
tacit admission. Key-El, 349 Md.
at 818, 709 A.2d at 1308.
Therefore, the court concluded that
the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the
defendant's silence as a tacit
admission into evidence. Id. at
820, 709 A.2d at 1309.
The court then addressed the
issue of whether the defendant's
Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination was violated by
the admission of his pre-arrest
silence. Id. at 820-21, 709 A.2d at
1309.
In addressing the
defendant's claim, the court turned
to Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231 (1980), in which the United
States Supreme Court held that the
use of a defendant's pre-arrest
silence to impeach his testimony at
trial did not improperly burden his
Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent. Key-El, 349 Md. at 822,
709 A.2d at 1310. Justice Stevens,
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 56

in his concurring opinion in
Jenkins wrote, '" [w]hen a citizen is
under no official compulsion
whatever, whether to speak or to
remain silent, I see no reason why
his voluntary decision to do one or
the other should raise any issue
under the Fifth Amendment. '" Id.
at 824, 709 A.2d at 1311 (quoting
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 243-44).
The court of appeals,
applying Justice Stevens' logic,
found that although police officers
were present, the defendant had
not been arrested and "was under
no official compulsion to speak or
remain silent." Id. at 825, 709
A.2d at 1311.
Therefore,
inferences of guilt could be made
from his silence and use of those
inferences as evidence did not
violate his Fifth Amendment
rights. Id.
Judge Raker, joined by Chief
Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge,
dissented, arguing that the
defendant's tacit admission in the
presence of police officers was too
ambiguous. Id. Such evidence
should not be admissible because
the defendant may have believed
he was exercising his "right to
remain silent." Id. Additionally,
the dissent was concerned that the
admission was used as substantive
evidence, not simply as evidence
used to impeach the defendant. Id.
A critical aspect of the present case
that influenced the dissent's
opinion was the presence of law
enforcement officers during the
defendant's silence. Id. at 828-30,
709 A.2d at 1313-14. The dissent
pointed out that "the accused
might well remain silent because

. . . he thinks he has the right to
remain silent that the mass media
have so well publicized." Id. at
830, 709 A.2d at 1314. Therefore,
the dissent argued that pre-arrest
silence in the presence of police
officers should not be admitted
into evidence as a tacit admission.
Id. at 833, 709 A.2d at 1315.
In Key-El v. State, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland held that
the defendant's pre-arrest silence
in the presence of police officers
may be admitted into evidence as a
tacit admission without violating
the defendant's Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination.
Therefore, if a person is accused of
a crime and has not yet been
arrested, it may be in the person's
best interest to respond to the
accusation instead of simply
remaining silent.
The court's
decision is sound under Maryland
law and comports with the rules of
evidence. However, as the dissent
pointed out, it is logical to think
that what you do not say cannot
hurt you. A fundamental concept
of the American legal system is
that the burden of proving a
defendant's guilt lies with the
prosecution. With this ruling we
are telling suspects that they are
not considered innocent until
proven guilty if they remain silent
in the face of an accusation.
Additionally, in an already heated
moment, this could create a
dangerous situation for police
officers. It is easier for police
officers to control a situation if the
parties are calm and not engaging
in excited exchanges. As a matter
of personal liberty and public
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order, a person should be
encouraged to remain silent and
calm. Despite this, the court chose
a rigid adherence to precedent
rather than a pragmatic view of
such situations.
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